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Abstract— The Internet of Things has facilitated access to a large volume of sensitive information on each participating object 
in an ecosystem. This imposes many threats ranging from the risks of data management to the potential discrimination enabled 
by data analytics over delicate information such as locations, interests, and activities. To address these issues, the concept of 
trust is introduced as an important role in supporting both humans and services to overcome the perception of uncertainty and 
risks before making any decisions. However, establishing trust in a cyber world is a challenging task due to the volume of 
diversified influential factors from cyber-physical-systems. Hence, it is essential to have an intelligent trust computation model 
that is capable of generating accurate and intuitive trust values for prospective actors. Therefore, in this paper, a quantifiable 
trust assessment model is proposed. Built on this model, individual trust attributes are then calculated numerically. Moreover, a 
novel algorithm based on machine learning principles is devised to classify the extracted trust features and combine them to 
produce a final trust value to be used for decision making. Finally, our model’s effectiveness is verified through a simulation. The 
results show that our method has advantages over other aggregation methods. 
Index Terms— Clustering, Computational Trust, Feature extraction, Knowledge acquisition, Model classification 
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1 INTRODUCTION
HE concept of the Internet of Things (IoT), which has 
made many unthinkable inventions possible, has been 
a major breakthrough in the past decade and many more 
years to come. In an IoT infrastructure, billions of elec-
tronic devices are connected to the Internet and these de-
vices are equipped with sensors that observe or monitor 
various aspects of human life in the real world for support-
ing more ubiquitous and intelligent services. A modern 
day IoT ecosystem involves the networking among physi-
cal devices and cyber components as well as the social in-
teractions of them. This is essentially a leap forward of 
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) and the formation of Cyber-
Physical-Social Systems (CPSS) to connect the Cyber-Phys-
ical world with social world objects [1]. Based on the CPSS 
concept, the new IoT model, which incorporates social par-
adigms into the IoT ecosystem, is introduced to explain the 
social behavior of objects along with human interactions 
[2].   
However, this integration introduces new concerns for 
risks, privacy and security at both system and social levels 
as a result of heterogeneous interactions among humans 
and objects. Consequently, managing risks and securing 
IoT are broader in scope and pose greater challenges than 
the traditional privacy and security triad of integrity, con-
fidentiality, and availability in the physical and cyber 
world. The aim of future IoT services is to make decisions 
autonomously without human intervention. In this regard, 
trust has been recognized as a vital key for processing and 
handling data, and for complying with the services, busi-
ness, and customer needs. Accordingly, ITU-T has been de-
veloping related standards for trust provisioning after 
publishing the first recommendation [3] based on the ac-
tivities of Correspondence Group on Trust. For supporting 
trust, it is crucial to minimize unexpected risks and max-
imize risk predictability using a trust platform. This plat-
form should help the IoT infrastructure to operate in a con-
trolled manner and to avoid unpredicted conditions and 
service failures. 
Many trust evaluating schemes have been proposed in 
the literature, beginning from early research work done by 
Marsh in his dissertation [4]. However, they lack the infor-
mation about generic framework details, which defines all 
aspects of trust including information gathering, pro-
cessing and producing measurable values as the outcome 
of the platform. Moreover, labeling a particular entity as 
trustworthy or not based on a given data set of several hun-
dreds of interactions is a vital matter when it comes to fea-
sible deployment. To this end, we have found no such re-
search that has investigated labeling based on trustworthi-
ness. To rectify such a weakness, this paper extends our 
previous related work in [5-7], which covers a preliminary 
trust framework, a computational model based on a nu-
merical approach and a survey on existing computational 
models respectively.  
There are several trust related frameworks can be ob-
served the literature, like  [8] and [9] based on privacy, [5] 
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and [21] based on reputation, and [10] and [11] based on 
social relationships. On the other hand there are some 
frameworks which are aiming particular application area 
like ad-hoc networks [12], P2P [13] and social networks 
[14]. However, these approaches lack generality in terms 
of application domain and target area. Therefore, it is es-
sential that trust mechanisms are designed and developed 
to look ahead to the future where many individual objects 
are interconnected with new vulnerabilities possibly intro-
duced in heterogeneous systems and application domains. 
To realize this in a rational manner, a two-step process is 
followed. As the first step, a novel framework is proposed 
that defines trust metrics (TMs) under three categories: 
“Knowledge”, “Experience”, and “Reputation” which rep-
resent all aspects of trust in any system. Then as the second 
step, the trust attributes (TAs), which represent major TMs, 
can be identified, depending on the application area and 
methods, which can assess them. The obvious benefit is 
that experts and systems can work on each individual TM, 
depending on their expertise areas and compose them later 
for a more complete solution rather than proposing indi-
vidual pieces of inventions, which are less practical in real 
world scenarios. 
As our approach here is more concentrated on numeri-
cal aspects, the focus of this paper is on generating numer-
ically measurable values by combining mathematical 
methods with intelligent Machine Learning (ML) tech-
niques. The choice of the method depends on a balance of 
several factors like accuracy, computational resources, ef-
ficiency, availability of data, and urgency of the situation 
concerned.  
This paper is an extension of our previous work [6] in 
terms of architectural design model, feature extraction 
methodologies, and intelligent algorithms  to analyse fea-
tures and autonomically assess a trust value without hu-
man intervention. The major new contributions of this pa-
per are to: (i) present a comprehensive trust framework 
model which specifies the formation of trust from raw data 
to a final trust value, (ii) offer an analytical approach to as-
sess the data and evaluate each individual trust feature, (iii) 
present a clustering algorithm to label the extracted trust 
features, (iv) propose an intelligent model based on a mul-
ticlass classification algorithm to combine measured TMs 
to formulate a trust assessment model, and (v) evaluate the 
effectiveness of the findings in a simulative environment.  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose 
a trust assessment scheme in the above order over multiple 
features of a real data set. It composes both numerical and 
machine learning concepts in addition to the novel frame-
work proposed, which encourage existing systems to 
adapt these definitions and concepts to effectively collabo-
rate and design systems that are more robust in future.  
Further, we have compared and proved in later sections 
that the proposed algorithm shows 2% improvement in 
contrast to previous algorithms [15], [16].  In addition, the 
algorithm is capable of adapting to the changes of the in-
teractions over time and gaining a more powerful insight 
compared to the traditional methods like the liner aggre-
gation in which behaviors of the objects are believed in 
such a way that they would act in the same manner as be-
fore in future. This shows a prominent feature of our algo-
rithm towards designing an autonomous system that is ca-
pable of assessing trust dynamically without external in-
terventions but intelligent enough to predict future misbe-
haviors. Moreover, the algorithm is not limited to classify 
the trustworthiness based on the proposed features only 
but open to accept any number of features. Hence, the al-
gorithm is essentially a generalized one and can apply in 
any use case from smart home to cross border application 
domains without any restrictions.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we survey related contributions on trust model-
ing, management, and computation methods. Following 
that, the design principles of a trust framework are defined 
in Section 3, which provides a foundation for the work, 
proposed. Section 4 discusses a basic feature extraction 
methodology for a genuine data set according to the IoT 
concepts. Based on this methodology, the development of 
a ML based algorithm is presented in Section 5. The nu-
merical model and algorithms are tested in a simulation 
environment elaborated in Section 6. The simulation re-
sults are discussed in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes 
the paper and outlines our future work.  
2 RELATED APPROACHES 
Trust management technologies have been widely investi-
gated in many fields including economics, sociology, and 
computer science [4], [17], [18]. Current research on trust 
management systems in computer science is often focused 
on solving security and privacy related issues. For example, 
trust management systems established on privacy policies 
are presented in [8],  and [9]. A survey on trust and repu-
tation systems based on ad-hoc networks is presented in 
[12]. They specifically discuss architectures, TAs, and 
scopes of a trust management system for such networks. 
Momani et al. [19] argue the difference between trust and 
security in wireless sensor networks (WSN). Furthermore, 
authors in [13] dispute a decentralized trust management 
platform for peer-to-peer (P2P) applications. They present 
an innovative approach to classifying trust based on cre-
dential and policy, reputation, and social network infor-
mation. 
On the issue of trust computational methods, authors in 
[7], [20] explain several trust evaluation schemes based on 
the concepts of network architecture, policy, reputation, 
and hybrid methods. Methods based on network architec-
ture use some structural information like in-degree, out-
degree and page rank concepts as in [5], [21] to extract 
some trust related properties like reputation. Basically, 
policy based mechanisms are used to estimate whether an 
object is trustworthy, depending on a set of predefined 
rules or credentials as in [22], [23]. Reputation systems 
keep a track of the status of interactions and behaviors in 
order to make a trust decision, such as those used by eBay 
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[10]  and KeyNote [11]. 
On the other hand, social interactions among objects 
disclose the valuable information of trust in analogy to the 
sociology concept of human interactions based on trust re-
lationships. In this regard, authors in [14] and [24] have de-
veloped a social model of cyber objects corresponding to 
their owner’s social behavior. In such models objects inter-
act with each other based on their trust relationships and 
reveal many information in terms of trust as described in 
[25], [26]. Moreover, [27] and [28] discuss about trust as-
sessment of a social network based on concepts like a com-
munity of interest, friendship, followers as well as fre-
quency, duration and behavior of the objects. In a similar 
manner, authors in [29] and [30] present a computational 
model for trust based on similarity, information reliability, 
and social opinions. 
However, the influence of a particular TA on trust is de-
termined by a weighting factor, but the assessment of a 
proper weightage is a complex task due to the fact that 
trust is a varying quantity which depends on many factors, 
e.g. expectations of a trustor, time, context, etc. Thus, 
schemes that are more intelligent are required to find these 
weighting factors and a threshold that defines a trustwor-
thy boundary. Authors in [8], [31] and [32] investigate 
more innovative models and solutions for privacy, security 
and data integrity based on statistical and deep learning 
concepts. Moreover, authors in [33] and [34] propose a re-
gression based model which compares the variation of 
trustworthiness with respect to trust features in mobile ad-
hoc networks (MANET) and WSN. However, they have in-
vestigated a limited number of trust features, which only 
represent the system level information like packet for-
warding ratio, Quality of Service, energy-sensitivity, capa-
bility-limitation, and profit-awareness. This motivates us 
to present a generic trust framework that represents fea-
tures from both social level as well as system level data.  
Recently, authors in [35], [36] and [37] present several 
trust management frameworks based on reinforcement 
learning and multiclass classification techniques which lay 
the foundation for the algorithms considered in this work. 
Even though these research achievements show some 
prominent results by applying ML techniques, they still 
lack the potential of being a generic algorithm that can be 
commonly applicable to any service domains without lim-
iting to specific infrastructures like MANET, WSN, Under-
water Acoustic Networks etc. In addition, they only con-
sider quite limited as well as conventional factors like en-
ergy saved in a particular transaction, delay, intrusion sen-
sitivity, throughput, etc. for the trust assessment process. 
Moreover, they are missing the information about extract-
ing social features, an intelligent labeling method and a 
trust prediction technique. 
3 GENERIC TRUST MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
Typically, trust can be seen as a metric used to evaluate so-
cial actors in consideration of mutual benefits, coordina-
tion, and cooperation. Actors continuously update their 
trust on others in response to perception fluctuations due 
to direct interactions and based on believes and opinions 
of others who are around. Trust is a crucial fact that affects 
the appetite of an object to consume a particular service or 
product offered by another object. This example can be 
seen in our everyday life where trust decisions are made. 
When purchasing a specific product, we may favor certain 
brands due to our trust that these brands will provide ex-
cellent quality compared to unknown brands. Trust in 
these brands may come from our previous experience in 
using these brands’ products, from their reputations per-
ceived by other people who bought their items and left 
opinions about those products, or from suggestions of 
your surroundings such as families and friends. 
In analogy to above viewpoint, trust also affects the de-
cision of an object to transact with another object in an IoT 
ecosystem in which all participating objects must take de-
cisions based on trust to provide/receive services to/from 
other objects. However, building trust in IoT is much more 
difficult due to the inability of machine objects to generate 
perceptions about other objects around them like humans. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to quantify the exact trustwor-
thiness value of an object with a high accuracy. This is even 
harder when each object has a different interpretation and 
perception of the term “trustworthy”. Therefore, they may 
assign different trustworthiness values to a provider or a 
service. As an example, a service consumer object assigns 
“very trustworthy” to the provider for a specific transac-
tion that it has performed. However, another consumer ob-
ject might assign “untrustworthy” for a similar transaction 
from the same provider. These differences further increase 
the difficulty to determine the exact trustworthiness of a 
provider. 
Therefore, it is essential to establish a generic frame-
work which defines the blueprint of a trust management 
process while keeping in mind the diversity of trust fea-
tures and hence the flexibility given to objects to choose 
best and practical measures. To clarify the ambiguities and 
definitions of trust, we use the following definitions in the 
context of a cyber world in this paper [3]: 
 
Definition 1. Trust  
It is a qualitative or quantitative property of a trustee, eval-
uated by a trustor as a measurable belief, in a subjective or 
objective manner, for a given task, in a specific context, for a 
specific time period. 
 
Definition 2: Trust Model 
It comprises three TMs: Knowledge, Experience, and Repu-
tation. Each TM is a collective representation of several TAs. 
Each TA represents the trustworthiness feature of a trustee.  
 
We use the term “trustor” to represent an object that is 
expected to initiate an interaction with another object and 
“trustee” as the second object that provides necessary in-
formation towards the trustor upon its request. The first 
thing that we want to emphasize in the definition of trust 
is the nature of the measurement that can take either a 
quantitative or a qualitative form. Apart from the well-
known numerical measurements like similarity, accuracy, 
etc., qualitative properties like motivation, awareness, and 
commitment can also be used to judge certain situations in 
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the process of trust based decision making. In addition, it 
is important to recognize trust as a belief even in the cyber 
world. That means, trust is a relative phenomenon and 100% 
belief is neither practical nor achievable in a diverse envi-
ronment like IoT. 
 Moreover, the perception of trust can be either subjec-
tive or objective, depending on the requirement of the trus-
tor and the availability of needed information. If the trustor 
wants TMs in a specific format that goes with the trustor’s 
profile of interest, then the measurements can be charac-
terized as subjective. On the other hand, objective 
measures can be described as TAs collected without any 
profile based filtering. Lastly, it is utmost important to de-
fine trust specifically for a particular task, context and time 
frame. For example, one might trust another for their cloud 
storage services but not for online streaming services, i.e. 
task dependent trust. Further, this trustworthiness rela-
tionship to obtain cloud services might be for a temporary 
duration and not for persistent time, i.e. time dependent 
trust. Moreover, a client might use different cloud services 
in different countries, as he does not trust the same pro-
vider globally, i.e. context dependent trust. Hence, trust is 
a variable in nature and hence cannot be assigned perma-
nently to measure every task and every context of a specific 
actor or object. Further, we need to emphasize that trust is 
a relative quantity between two or more objects in opposite 
to a measurement of individual objects. Having stated the 
generic definition of trust, our next step is to define the 
course of trust acquisition, evaluation, and representation 
in an automatic or semi-automatic way in a computational 
setting, which we illustrate as the trust model in Fig. 1.  
3.1 Knowledge Trust Metric 
The knowledge TM covers all aspects of direct trust 
evaluations, which provide a perception about a trustee 
before an interaction. This is equivalent to analyzing the 
resume of a prospective candidate before hiring. To make 
this possible, it must provide relevant data to the trustor 
for its assessment. If a data feature can be represented us-
ing a quantitative measurement, then the result is a numer-
ical value in a certain range. As an example, social relation-
ships like co-location and co-work, credibility factors like 
cooperativeness, time dependent features like the fre-
quency and duration of interactions, and spatial distribu-
tion of relevant trustees compared to the trustor can be 
used as direct trust measurements. The TAs, which we 
evaluate in this paper using ML techniques, are shown in 
Fig. 2.   
The relationship TAs in Fig. 2 defines the mutual rela-
tionship between the trustor and a trustee. It is reasonable 
to assume that if two objects have a noble relationship be-
tween them, a higher trustworthiness can be expected be-
tween them. As an example, if the trustor and the trustee 
are operated closely by location such as looking for a park-
ing lot near a supermarket, then both benefit (e.g. getting a 
vacant, closest, easily navigable parking lot) from their re-
lationship based on location similarity that we have iden-
tified as co-location TA. Likewise, if the two objects are in 
a working relationship like car sharing in which one needs 
to provide a service and other needs to get the service, both 
can support each other via their co-work association.  
Furthermore, it is important to maintain knowledge 
about the consistency of trustworthy service provisioning. 
We discuss properties related to this issue under credibil-
ity. The cooperativeness under credibility in Fig. 2 repre-
sents the level of social cooperation from the trustee to the 
trustor. The higher cooperativeness means the higher trust 
level in an IoT ecosystem. A user can evaluate the cooper-
ativeness of others based on social ties and select socially 
cooperative users. Additionally, we have introduced a re-
warding system in order to track the history of misbehav-
ior situations or unsuitable reactions originated by the 
trustee. Rewarding TA can be used to either encourage or 
discourage further interactions with a particular trustee 
based on its past character.  
To capture the significance of time related information 
to trustworthiness evaluation, TAs like the frequency and 
duration of the interactions can be used. It is logical to as-
sume that the higher frequency and duration of interac-
tions, the more trust is built up among the associating ob-
jects. On the contrary, the shorter time spent on each other, 
the less knowledge gathered on each other’s behaviors and 
capabilities. As an example, in whitewashing attacks, a dis-
honest object can vanish for some time and rejoin the ser-
vice in order to clear its reputation. However, if a trustor 
can keep a record of the consistency of the interested trus-
tees then it can avoid such situations. 
Moreover, in an IoT ecosystem, service provisioning 
 
Fig. 1. Generic Trust Model: A prototype that explains the trust acquisi-
tion and evaluation process based on three TMs, knowledge, experience, 
and reputation as described in Section 3.1 and 3.2.  
 
Fig. 2. Composition of Knowledge: Describes the TAs that influence the 
evaluation of knowledge TM as explained in Section 3.1.  
Trust Model
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(discover, manage and terminate) is based on its social re-
lationships without solely depending on the underlying 
system level information. Therefore, it is vital to identify 
TAs, which determine the social proximity of the objects in 
collaboration. In this aspect, we identify three properties 
under spatial TAs in Fig. 2 as mutuality, centrality, and 
community of interest as governing features that define the 
social positioning of a trustee. Mutuality measures the de-
gree of profile similarity between the trustee and trustor in 
resemblance to what is used in social networking. The 
community-interest represents whether the trustor and the 
trustee have a close relationship in terms of social commu-
nities, groups, and capabilities. Two objects with a degree 
of high community-interest have more opportunities in in-
teracting with each other, and thus can result in a higher 
trust level. Centrality measures the importance of a trustee 
among other objects with respect to a particular task and 
context. 
3.2 Experience and Reputation Trust Metrics 
After acquiring enough evidences about trustees 
through the knowledge TM, the trustor can initiate collab-
orations with selected trustees based on the perception that 
the trustor has already obtained. However, the result of 
these interactions might differ from the perception and 
hence it is critical to keep a record of each individual expe-
rience to be used in future interactions. For instance, expe-
rience might be a feedback from consumers after each 
transaction (as used in many e-Commerce systems), just a 
Boolean value (0/1) indicating whether a service transac-
tion successfully operates (as in some reputation-based 
trust systems), etc. Then, by accumulating these experi-
ences over time in relation to the corresponding contexts, 
tasks and times, the trustor can build up additional intelli-
gence compared to the knowledge TM. 
To further enhance the perception of the trustor, other 
objects can share their experience in using the trustee, 
upon a request by the trustor, which we identify as repu-
tation or the global opinion of the trustee. As an example, 
we have come up with a non-bias PageRank based model 
to calculate reputation values of trustees in a distributed 
network as in [5]. 
 In summary, the experience TM is a personal observa-
tion considering only interactions from a trustor to a trus-
tee, whereas the reputation TM reflects the global opinion 
of the trustee. However, the knowledge TM is the building 
block of both experience and reputation and hence the fo-
cus of this research is to generate quantitative results for 
the knowledge TM based on ML techniques. 
4 COMPUTATIONAL MODEL 
Even though an IoT environment produces a large amount 
of data, it is questionable how much of them can be directly 
used for the trustworthy evaluation process. Therefore, it 
is vital to extract trust features by scanning social and sys-
tem level interaction logs and store them in a data reposi-
tory (DR) for further analysis. Hence, a numerical model 
that can extract basic features discussed in Section 3 is ad-
dressed here.  
 For that, we define the assessment of knowledge (K) to-
wards an object j by an object i at time t as Kxij(t), where x 
represents one of the features: Co-location relationship 
(CLR), Co-work relationship (CWR), Mutuality and Cen-
trality (MC), Cooperativeness-Frequency-Duration (CFD), 
and Reward. Note that trust assessment is always between 
two or more objects. 
4.1 Co-Location Relationship (CLR) 
An IoT ecosystem enables users to share their resources, 
ideas, situations, and interested services with nearby de-
vices. In such a situation, if both the trustor and the trustee 
are in close proximity and have subscribed to a DR in the 
platform, the trustor can conveniently get the required in-
formation from the selected trustee who is trustworthy in 
terms of the physical location compared to other objects far 
away from the scenario. However, in an IoT model, objects 
are always in relationship with their owner (Owner Object 
Relationship-OOR) and hence the static or dynamic nature 
of the OOR always affects the CLR [2]. In order to avoid 
objects leaving the physical location, a decision boundary 
based on the distance from the trustor (e.g. based on GPS 
data) and the time spent within this decision boundary are 
taken into consideration. Then the objects, which are 
within this distance boundary and exceed the minimum 
time threshold inside the region, are selected as prospec-
tive candidates for a trustee. Once the candidates are fil-
tered, their CL relationship with the trustor can be calcu-
lated as follows: 
 
𝐾𝑖𝑗
CLR (𝑡) =
1
𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐭(𝑖, 𝑗)
GiGj
‖Gi‖‖Gj‖
  (1) 
Here, g𝑖 and g𝑗  are the GPS coordinates of the trustor i 
and trustee j, respectively. The symbol “‖.‖” defines the 
norm of an element. The second term in (1)  is the cosine 
similarity between the two objects and it is normalized by 
the geo distance factor 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐭(𝑖, 𝑗) which can be calculated as 
in [38]. The application of the geo distance factor is im-
portant here as it provides a value with respect to an actual 
surface distance of the earth in contrast to a linear distance. 
4.2 Co-work Relationship (CWR) 
The objects that are collaborating in common IoT applica-
tions can be characterized as CWR. In such a situation, 
more focus would be on working relationship in a particu-
lar service domain rather than their physical proximity. To 
measure CWR as a numerical value, we compare the mul-
ticast interactions between a trustor and a trustee, as calcu-
lated below: 
 
𝐾𝑖𝑗
CWR (𝑡) =
|𝐜𝑖𝑗
MI|
|𝐜𝑗
MI|
  (2) 
where cijMI is the vector of multicast interactions (MI) be-
tween trustor i  and trustee j, and cjMI is the vector of MI 
originated at j. The symbol “|. |” represents the determi-
nant of a vector. KCWRij(t) represents a relative measure-
ment of shared multicast messages to total messages orig-
inated at the trustee.  
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4.3 Cooperativeness, Frequency and Duration 
(CFD) 
In a collaborative environment, it is important that every 
object execute its commitment to improve the level of the 
outcome of the whole service provision process. As an ex-
ample, consider a malicious agent that provides fake rat-
ings for a specific service. In this case, it is obvious that this 
agent deliberately tries to manipulate the genuineness of 
the information on the service and does not have any in-
tention to use it. Therefore, the cooperativeness TA is vital 
to maintain the above-mentioned content stability and 
thereby to provide a trustworthy service to the trustor 
upon its request. Furthermore, it can be anticipated that the 
more frequent and longer the interactions among objects, 
the more collaboration from each party can be expected. 
Based on this, a numerical model for cooperativeness, fre-
quency, and duration is derived. 
Let us consider a set of interactions, c1, c2... cn over some 
period in which the trustor is interested. A trust level be-
tween trustor i and trustee j is calculated below: 
 
𝐾𝑖𝑗
CFD (𝑡) = ∑
c𝑚 
t𝑚
𝐸(𝑐𝑚)
𝑛
𝑚=1
  (3) 
Here, n is the number of interactions, indicating how 
frequent they interact with each other. For the mth success-
ful interaction, c𝑚 is the length of an interaction between 
the trustor and the trustee, tm is the total interaction length 
by the trustee. The factor cm/tm assesses the duration prop-
erty, in which the trustee interacts with the trustor, relative 
to the total activity time of the trustee. 𝐸(c𝑚) is the binary 
entropy function which measures the balance in the inter-
action or the cooperativeness which can be calculated as 
follows [26]:  
 𝐸(c𝑚) = −𝑝 log 𝑝 − (1 − 𝑝)log (1 − 𝑝)  (4) 
where p is the fraction of the interactions between the 
trustor and the trustee. E(cm) follows a binary distribution 
as stated in [39]. It is evident that the maximum entropy 
(i.e. 𝐸(c𝑚)=1) is reachable only when p=0.5 that is 50% con-
tribution from each party.  
4.4 Reward System (RS) 
An essential component of any service provisioning sys-
tem needs to have a reward and punishing mechanism or 
a feedback model in order to assess the historical service 
experiences between a trustor and a trustee. It is always 
critical to maintain the social relationships at the maximum 
trustworthy level and hence we use the exponential down-
grading formula shown in equation (5) for this purpose.  
 
𝐾𝑖𝑗
RS(𝑡) =
‖𝐶‖ − ‖𝐶p‖
‖𝐶‖
𝑒
(−
‖𝐶p‖
‖𝐶‖
)
 (5) 
Here, C is the total number of interactions that have 
taken place during a period t, and Cp is the total number 
of unsuccessful or suspicious interactions. To punish mis-
behavior situations more severely, the slope of the distri-
bution is increased, compared to the standard exponential 
distribution. Hence, a higher number of malicious interac-
tions will result a lower reward value. 
4.5 Mutuality and Centrality (MC) 
In an IoT ecosystem, service discovery and provisioning 
largely depend on the social relationship among the par-
ticipating objects. In this regard, the mutuality and the cen-
trality TAs define the location of a trustee with respect to a 
trustor in a social world. On the other hand, it is very intu-
itive to assume that a higher number of mutual objects im-
ply higher similarity between their social profiles. How-
ever, mutuality alone cannot be used as a TA due to the 
number of mutual friends being proportional to the num-
ber of friends of each individual object. That is, an object 
with a higher number of friends gets an additional ad-
vantage compared to an object that has recently joined the 
network but has higher trustworthiness. In order to avoid 
such circumstances, a relative measurement of mutuality 
compared to the total number of friends is considered. This 
is essentially the centrality property of the trustee and is 
calculated below:  
 
𝐾𝑖𝑗
MC(𝑡) =
|𝑀𝑖𝑗|
|𝑁𝑖|
 (6) 
where Mij be the set of common friends between i  and j, 
and Ni is the set of trustee’s friends.  
4.6 Community of Interest (CoI) 
Objects in an IoT environment usually collaborate with at 
least one community. As an example, a person is registered 
as a frequent customer of a car sharing community while 
being a member of several other communities like online 
markets, social networking groups, etc. If another person 
is also a member of the car sharing community, this shows 
the resemblance of interest of both persons’ interests. Sim-
ilarly, if the trustor and the trustee share common interest 
groups, that is an indication of the degree of the common 
interest or similar capabilities of the trustee compared to 
the trustor. Mathematically, let us define Mijcoi as the set of 
communities where both the trustor and the trustee are in-
volved in, and Nijcoi as the set of communities with each in-
cluding the trustee as a member. Please note that both the 
trustor and the trustee can be a member of several commu-
nities and hence the trust level of the trustee based on CoI 
is calculated in (7). 
 
𝐾𝑖𝑗
CoI(𝑡) =
|𝑀𝑖𝑗
CoI|
|𝑁𝑖
CoI|
 (7) 
After the extraction of all the TAs using equations (1), 
(2), (3), (5), (6) and (7), the next step is to calculate the final 
trust value of the trustee. A well-known approach is to 
combine each TA through a linear equation with weighting 
factors as shown in (8). 
 
 𝐾𝑖𝑗(𝑡) =  𝐾𝑖𝑗
CLR(𝑡) + β𝐾𝑖𝑗
CWR(𝑡) + 𝐾𝑖𝑗
CFD(𝑡) 
                  + ε𝐾𝑖𝑗
RS(𝑡) + 𝐾𝑖𝑗
MC(𝑡)  + 𝐾𝑖𝑗
CoI(𝑡) 
(8) 
However, there are many drawbacks in this approach, 
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including (i) lack of information and an infinite number of 
possibilities when it comes to estimate a weighting factor, 
(ii) unsuitability of a threshold based system to detect the 
trustworthiness of a particular trustee, and (iii) inability to 
identify which TA makes the most influence on the trust in 
a particular context. Thus, we will propose a new approach 
to the trust evaluation process in the next section. 
5 MACHINE LEARNING BASED MODEL 
To overcome the weakness about the TA combination dis-
cussed in the previous section, we propose a ML based 
model to analyze the TAs extracted before and predict the 
trustworthiness of prospective transactions based on the 
trained model. In order to achieve this, we first use an un-
supervised learning algorithm to identify two different 
clusters or labels, namely trustworthy and untrustworthy. 
The main reason to use the unsupervised learning over a 
supervised method is due to the fact of unavailability of a 
labeled training set based on trustworthiness relationships.  
Then a multi-class classification technique like support 
vector machine (SVM) is used to train the ML model in or-
der to identify the best threshold level that separates trust-
worthy interactions from others. In this research, our main 
objective is to differentiate malicious interactions from 
trustworthy interactions with maximum boundary separa-
tion and minimum outliers rather than classification itself. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to go for other algorithms like 
Random Forest, especially with a low dimensional dataset 
compared to its sample size used in this work. However, 
depending on the data set, dimensionality, number of clas-
sifications required and noise levels of the samples, a 
model comparison can be performed to find out the best 
possible algorithm for each individual case. A well-trained 
model like this can differentiate an incoming interaction 
between two or more objects much more efficiently than 
linear weightage methods [15], [16] and is much more ben-
eficial in the decision making process.  
Let us define the number of features considered in the 
model as n and the length of the training set as m. We use 
the five features defined in Section 4, i.e. CWR, CFD, RS, 
MC and CoI to train our model. They are expressed as a 
feature matrix X(i)(j) where i denotes the ith training sample 
and j signifies the jth feature among the n features. Moreo-
ver, the label of each training sample i is denoted by y(i). 
However, training labels are not readily available and a 
method for the labeling will be discussed in the sub-section 
below. These allow us to identify each training set as (X(i)(j), 
y(i)) for i=1,2,…,m and j=1,2,…,n. In the following sub sec-
tions, we break down our main algorithm in to two parts 
and explain it separately in Section 5.1, and 5.2 respectively. 
5.1 Algorithm I: Clustering and Labeling 
In this section, we develop an algorithm based on the K-
means clustering technique, which is specified in detail in 
Algorithm I, in order to group interactions based on the 
aforementioned features and thereby label each interaction 
as trustworthy or untrustworthy [40]. The K-means algo-
rithm needs to define two initial conditions: number of 
clusters (k) and initial centroid positions () that each inter-
action is assigned to. As there is no way to find out these 
values at the beginning of the algorithm, we randomly as-
sign initial centroid locations for a range of cluster sizes, 
e.g. from k=1 to k=5. After that, steps 6-9 in Algorithm I are 
executed until the cluster points “” are not changing any 
further (i.e. until the convergence). Then, the Elbow 
method is used to find out the optimum cluster size which 
gives the lowest value for the K-mean cost function J(c,) 
where c is the index of a cluster centroid and  is the coor-
dinates of cluster centroids with the dimension of k [40].  
Note that initial inputs to the algorithm were normal-
ized between [0, 1] in which “0” represents untrustworthi-
ness and “1” the most trustworthiness. Hence, it is logical 
to label points close “0” as untrustworthy and vice versa 
after the clusterization step. Therefore, after the step 13 of 
the algorithm, the clusters close to the origin (i.e. all zero 
point) of the N dimensional space is marked as “0” or un-
trustworthy and the cluster away from the origin is identi-
fied as a trustworthy region. To check the influence of all n 
features at once, the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
algorithm based on Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) 
is applied to reduce the N dimensions to two dimensions 
for visualization purposes as below before applying the al-
gorithm I [41]. Even though it is possible to extend Algo-
rithm I for n features with regularization, we observe that 
the PCA method is more efficient with respect to compu-
tational complexity of unsupervised learning with regular-
ization. 
Algorithm I : Data Clustering and Labelling 
1: 
2: 
3: 
4: 
5: 
6: 
7: 
8: 
9: 
10: 
11: 
12: 
13: 
14: 
15: 
16: 
17: 
18: 
19: 
Input: X       Output: y 
Initialize cluster centroids 1, 2,… k n 
for k=1 to 5 do 
    Repeat until convergence: { 
        for i=1 to m do 
            c(i):=arg minj||X(i)- k||2 
            k := Average of points assigned to cluster 
k 
        end for 
    }  
    J(k) (c,):=arg mink J(c,) 
end for 
Optimum k  Elbow method  plot J(k) vs k  
for i=1 to m do 
    if c(i) close to (0,0) 
        y(i) = 0 
    elseif 
        y(i) = 1 
    end if 
end for 
The first step of the PCA algorithm is to calculate the 
covariance matrix  that has the dimension of n x n. In the 
step two principal components U and V are calculated us-
ing the SVD function, each having the same dimension as 
 [41]. As our intention, here to reduce the dimensions 
from five to two, dimensions (d) of the principal matrix U 
is set to two. Finally, step four calculates the two-dimen-
sional feature vector Z in corresponding to five-dimension 
vector X.  
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Algorithm : Principal Component Analysis  
1: 
2: 
3: 
4: 
Compute dot product matrix: =XTX 
Compute eigenvectors: [U,S,V]=SVD(XTX) 
Specify the required dimension ,d: Ud=[u1,…ud] 
Compute d(=2) features: Z= UdTX      
 5.2 Algorithm II: Classification Model  
Having obtained the completed data set (X(i)(j), y(i)) via Al-
gorithm I, the next step is to train an algorithm based on a 
SVM technique which can identify the nonlinear bounda-
ries of trustworthy and untrustworthy interactions. In or-
der to obtain the maximum accuracy of the learning algo-
rithm, the train set is divided into two parts in such a way 
that the training set occupies 80% of the data and 20% for 
the cross validation data set which is denoted as (X(i)val, y(i) 
val) for i=1,2,…, ⌊0.2*m⌋ and j=1,2,…,n. This is important to 
avoid overfitting data through the regularization parame-
ter and variance. 
In our Algorithm II, we use a Radial Basis Function Ker-
nel (RBFK) due to the smaller number of features (n) com-
pared to the training set samples (m) as the authors in [42] 
have claimed. Further, in order to optimize the computa-
tional resources, the LIBSVM library is used to run the 
RBFK kernel [43]. First, we run the RBFK kernel over mul-
tiple instances of regularization parameters and variances 
in order to find optimum parameters for the learning algo-
rithm as shown in step 4-7 in Algorithm II. As an example 
both c and   are varied as a geometric series (e.g. 0.01, 0.03, 
0.09… 30) to save the time and computation resources. 
Then the parameters which give the minimum error in the 
prediction step are chosen as the optimum factors for the 
SVM model. Further, it is essential to improve the accuracy 
of the final ML model and suppress any noise generated 
by the previous clustering algorithm. Hence, we use regu-
larization techniques to avoid such issues during the train-
ing process in Algorithm II.  
Algorithm II : Classification Model  
1: 
2: 
3: 
4: 
 
5: 
6: 
 
7: 
8: 
9: 
10: 
 
11: 
 
 
Input: X , y , Xval , yval 
Output: Weights and Decision boundary 
//Find best parameters c and  
for c, =0.01 (multiple of 3) 30 do 
    model=svmtrain(y,X,RBFK,c, ) 
    prediction=svmpredict(yval, Xval ,model) 
    error [c, ]= predictions ≠ yval 
end for 
Choose c,   minimum [error] 
[weights, accuracy, decision values]                              
                                       = svmtrain(y,X,RBFK,c, ) 
 
Afterwards, the algorithm is trained for all the training 
data samples using the algorithm II and model parameters 
are recorded to estimate future trust values based on the 
incoming feature statistics. The function svmtrain is de-
fined in the LIBSVM library and calculates the decision 
boundaries based on the RBFK kernel as per SVM tech-
nique. Similar to algorithm one, first we consider two trust 
features at a time and investigate the trust boundaries. Af-
ter that, features, which are derived through PCA algo-
rithm, are considered to investigate the effect of all five fea-
tures on the trust boundaries.  
6 SIMULATION SETUP 
To extract the aforementioned trust features to be used in 
the ML algorithms, we would need traces of many objects, 
which are not available now for IoT. Hence, we have used 
traces taken at the SIGCOMM-2009 conference which is 
available in CRAWDAD [44], [45]. These traces contain the 
information on device proximity, activity logs, friendship 
information, interested groups, application level message 
logs, and data layer transmission logs. We map the infor-
mation to match with the IoT concepts described in [9]. In 
other words, we define a set of features, CWR, CFD, RS, 
MC and CoI, related to IoT based on raw data found in the 
data set. Therefore, our experiment can be re-applied with 
any real world IoT data set for further experiments without 
any ambiguity. This leads to the parameter settings and 
scenario of our simulation, as detailed in Table 1. Among 
76 nodes, each pair of them (Trustor and Trustee) with at 
least a single interaction between them are considered as 
objects to match with the IoT concepts.  
After obtaining the trust feature vector Xj for each node 
pair, they are organized as in (9) to generate the m training 
samples. We have deliberately omitted the results from 
CLR as the data set itself was obtained from a very close 
proximity and it is not meaningful to test location-based 
trust in this scenario. The dimension of the training sample 
matrix is in order of m×n where m=5776 (node pairs) and 
n=5. The notation [.]T is used to denote the transpose of a 
vector and has the dimension of m×1. Note that feature 
normalization is not required here as each feature value is 
in the range of 0 and 1.   
[𝑿]𝑚×𝑛 =  [
⋮
[𝐶𝑊𝑅]T
⋮
⋮
[𝐶𝐹𝐷]T
⋮
⋮
[𝑅𝑆]T
⋮
⋮
[𝑀𝐶]T
⋮
⋮
[𝐶𝑜𝐼]T 
⋮
] (9) 
For the multiclass calcification problem, 4620 samples 
(i.e. 80% of the total samples) are chosen as the training set, 
and 1156 samples (i.e. around 20% of the total data set) are 
used as cross validation samples to avoid the data-overfit-
ting problem.  
For both ML experiments here, two features out of five 
are selected at a time for the sake of demonstration pur-
poses, as it is not feasible to show a five-dimension vector. 
However, it is critical to analyze five features at the same 
time and evaluate their influence on the final trust value. 
Therefore, we then consider all the five features together 
and generate numerical results. However, to demonstrate 
the results, the PCA method is used to reduce the dimen-
sions from five to two and generate the graphical results 
[46]. Note that PCA not only simplifies the visualization 
but also the algorithm complexity that make our model 
TABLE 1 
PARAMETERS OF THE DATA SET   
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Nodes 76 Interactions 18226 
Objects 5776 Communities 711 
Messages 899 Message Type (UC/MC/BC) 266/57/576 
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more practical in the case of a large number of features 
even though we use around five dimensions in this re-
search to prove the effectiveness of our model in trust eval-
uation. Here, feature normalization is used to bring the 
new data samples, obtained through PCA, in the range of 
zero and one. The experiment is carried out on a PC which 
consists of 8 CPUs (Intel Core i7-2600, 3.4GHz) and 8GB 
RAM. 
7 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this section, we present the simulation performance of 
our models in Sections 4 and 5. The simulation complexity 
is based on the number of interactions among objects and 
the number of nodes. For our feature extraction model, 
around 18000 interactions are used to generate each feature, 
and for the ML models, 5776 training samples are used.   
7.1 Feature Extraction 
Simulation results based on the numerical models defined 
in Section 4 are shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. It is noticeable 
that the distribution of trustworthiness values in the CLR 
feature is close to “1” as shown in Fig. 3 due to the fact that 
the data is collected from the devices which are closely 
speeded. Note that only a fraction of object pairs have CLR 
association among 5776 objects as the data points represent 
those which have at least one transaction. Moreover, the 
trust values are normalized to fall between “0” and “1”. 
One represents 100% trustworthy interactions and zero de-
notes untrustworthy interactions.  
On the other hand, the distribution of CWR associations 
shown in Fig. 3 shows weaker associations compared to 
the CLR case even though they closely work together. Dis-
similar intentions of each node can be one of the reasons 
that resulted in this kind of behavior. Further, the variation 
of trustworthiness values with respect to their cooperative-
ness, frequency and duration of the interactions is distrib-
uted towards the lower end of the graph as often radio fre-
quency (RF) communications are limited to asymmetric 
type interactions as well as message exchanges of short du-
rations. However, trust values based on the CoI and Cen-
trality are distributed in the range of 0.3 to 0.8 in the figure 
showing some amount of profile similarity among the 
nodes. Furthermore, rewarding values given to each inter-
action are biased toward the lower end of the scale. This is 
mainly due to the unsuccessful or ill behaviors caused in 
the past interactions. 
Similarly, Fig. 4 shows the distribution of trustworthi-
ness of each object (Trustees) with respect to one specific 
object (Trustor). We have chosen object “45” randomly in 
order to generate these results. This figure clearly shows 
the interpretation of trustors view on other adjacent objects 
with respect to the features we have discussed in Section 4. 
As an example, trustee object “34” shows high co-location 
relationship with the trustor compared to other features 
while MC, CFD and Reward is around 0.4, 0.15 and 0.16 
respectively. Therefore, it is possible that the trustor will 
engage in location-based services with the trustee in future 
interactions but limit its interactions related to collabora-
tive services, as the MC and CFD values are low. 
7.2 Algorithm I: Clustering and Labeling 
With the successful abstraction of the trust features, the 
next step is to investigate how to combine each of them to 
generate a final trust value. To filter out most trustworthi-
ness interactions from untrustworthy interactions, the al-
gorithm explained in Section 5 is applied and the results 
obtained are shown in Fig. 5. In order to decide the opti-
mum number of clusters, the Elbow method is used as 
shown in Fig. 6. In certain feature combinations, the algo-
rithm is capable to categorize interactions into three 
groups as trustworthy, neutral, and untrustworthy. In-
stances where the Elbow method gives K=3 represent such 
situations. The results clearly shows the boundaries of sep-
aration from the untrustworthy interactions as marked in 
Fig. 5.   
As an example, let us consider Fig. 5(a) that shows the 
distribution of trust values compared to centrality and 
community interest. It can be observed that the region 
above MC=0.6 and CoI=0.6 is the trustworthy region with 
respect to these two features. Similarly, Fig. 5(b) to Fig. 5(g) 
show a clear boundary between the trustworthy and un-
trustworthy regions. However,   Fig. 5(h) and Fig. 5(i) show 
slightly different results compared to others. In both fig-
ures, the trustworthiness boundaries are learned with one  
common feature: the reputation. From Fig. 5(h) and Fig. 
5(i), it is noticeable that the algorithm finds a lower trust 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Distribution of Trustworthiness Relative to Object “45”. 
 
Fig. 3. Distribution of Trustworthiness with respect to each Feature. A 5th 
order polynomial is used to fit the data, distributed between 0 and 1.  
 
(a) k=2 
 
(b) k=3 
Fig. 6. Elbow method: To decide the optimum number of clusters-k. 
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value when the reputation value is low, even with a higher 
trustworthiness value of CFD or CWR. This is one of the 
interesting results as reputation is one of the critical factors 
when it comes to the trustworthiness evaluation process.  
Note that we first run the algorithm pairwise to gener-
ate visual results and then combine all five features to find 
out the trustworthy region as shown in Fig. 7 where PCA 
is used to reduce the feature dimensions from 5D to 2D for 
the sake of visualizing the results. To bring the new dimen-
sions into the range of 0 and 1, feature normalization is im-
plemented. It can be clearly observed that values over 
around 0.5 on the 1st dimension and values over around 
0.7 on the 2nd dimension show the boundary between 
trustworthy and untrustworthy interactions. 
 
7.3 Algorithm II: Classification Model  
Having investigated which interactions belongs to the 
 
Fig. 7. Application of Algorithm I on features obtained via PCA. 
   
(a) MC and CoI (b) MC and CFD (c) MC and RS 
   
(d) CoI and CFD (e) CoI and CWR (f) CoI and RS 
   
(g) CFD and CWR (h) CFD and RS (i) CWR and RS  
 
Fig. 5. K-means clustering on different pairs of features. 
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trustworthy region, we have used this information to label 
the data set. As an example, let’s consider the same case in 
Fig. 5 (a). The points around the cluster centroid of the un-
trustworthy region are labeled as untrustworthy or “0” in 
the label vector “y”, whereas the points outside the un-
trustworthy centroid are labeled as trustworthy or “1”.  
Then, with the labeled data, we train a model that can 
clearly identify whether incoming interactions are trust-
worthy. To estimate the optimum boundary, it is im-
portant to calculate the best regularization parameters “C” 
and ”gamma”  for each scenario mentioned above to avoid 
the data overfitting. For that, we have used part of the 
training samples as a cross validation set and the results 
obtained via the trained model are shown in Fig. 8 that 
clearly illustrates the decision boundary between the trust-
worthy and untrustworthy regions.  
Furthermore, Fig. 9 shows the result after applying the 
dimensionality reduction for all five features. For instance, 
let us consider Fig. 8(a) in which the CoI and MC are in 
consideration. Now it is a matter of applying this model to 
the new data stream to distinguish which interactions fall 
into the trustworthy region and vice versa without any 
weight or threshold calculation. This not only reduces the 
calculation complexity and redundant work but also saves 
the processing time.  
With these proven results, it is evident now that the sys-
 
Fig. 9. Application of Algorithm II on all features obtain via PCA. 
   
(a) MC and CoI (b) MC and CFD (c) MC and RS 
   
(d) CoI and CFD (e) CoI and CWR (f) CoI and RS 
   
(g) CFD and CWR (h) CFD and RS (i) CWR and RS  
 
Fig. 8. Application of Algorithm II on different pairs of features. 
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tem does not need to rely on conventional weighting fac-
tors and thresholds to decide the region of trustworthiness. 
However, the main assumption of this research is the cen-
tralized nature of the trust computation platform. Particu-
larly, we assume that every object in consideration is sub-
scribed to a centralized DR for publishing its data so that 
the trust computational platform can access the data, train 
a model, and publish the trust values back into the DR, 
which can be used by trustors.  
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed 
method over the most common methods like the liner ag-
gregation of TAs, a confusion matrix method is considered. 
Classification accuracy often gives misleading results and 
hides the details needed to diagnose the performance of 
the model especially when the number of observations in 
each class varies as in our data set. On the other hand, the 
confusion matrix shows at which point the algorithm 
makes errors or gets confused and importantly the types of 
errors made, which is critical for the investigation of algo-
rithm applicability over expected results. For the compari-
son, we consider liner algorithms described in [15], [16 ] 
and a nonlinear algorithm described in [47]. The obtained 
results are shown in Table 2. Based on the results from Ta-
ble 2, parameters that define the performance of each algo-
rithm is shown in the Table 3.  
In classification, Recall gives an important insight about 
classification performance relative to the number of wrong 
predictions. According to our simulation results, the pro-
posed algorithm shows 100% Recall or true positive rate 
(TPR) compared to 98.13% by the linear methods. As the 
data set is relatively small, 2% performance improvement 
in the proposed algorithm will be very critical in real world 
application deployment where billions of transactions 
happen in each second. This is again confirmed by the false 
negative rate (FNR) where the proposed algorithm shows 
0% false negative predictions in comparison with 1.8% 
false predictions by liner methods. Note that TPR is similar 
in both proposed and nonlinear methods, as the nonlinear 
method only replaces the second part of the proposed al-
gorithm. But, the proposed method outperforms the non-
linear approach as it gives a lower false positive rate (FPR) 
and a higher true negative rate (TNR) in contrast to the lo-
gistic regression, indicating that the proposed method 
shows compelling performance against untrustworthy ob-
jects. 
Further, there are infinite possibilities when aggregat-
ing multiple TAs using a linear weighted summation 
method. However, in this comparison, the same weighting 
factors given by the clusterization algorithm are used in 
the liner algorithm to calculate the final score. Due to this 
reason, both proposed and logistic regression methods 
give a comparatively low score in contrast to the linear 
method. However, in realistic case, it is difficult to estimate 
these weighting factors without a proper clusterization al-
gorithm as discuss in this work and hence precision will 
severely degrade compared to our proposed method. On 
the other hand, the regularization factor used to manage 
the over fitted data and the optimization algorithm used to 
find the optimum parameters for the features could have a 
significant effect on this cause. Thus, the precision of both 
models can be increased by observing the learning curve 
while tweaking this regularization factor depending on the 
data set and using advance methods of optimization as de-
scribed in [48], [49].  
Moreover, the algorithms described in this paper can be 
clustered so that the end devices can perform a fraction of 
the analysis and obtain the same results as before. This is 
quite beneficial in an environment like IoT where scalabil-
ity and collaboration are prominent factors. To establish a 
distributed platform and address scalability issues, meth-
ods like map-reduction and data parallelism will be con-
sidered as strong candidate technologies in our future 
work [50].   
8  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, a novel algorithm is proposed as opposed 
to traditional weighted summations to determine 
whether an incoming interaction is trustworthy, based 
on several trust features corresponding to an IoT envi-
ronment. First, we have presented a generic trust com-
putational model and a feature extraction method that 
can be applied to any service scenarios in IoT. Then a 
method for labeling the data depending on their trust-
worthiness is realized based on unsupervised learning 
techniques, which is the vital first step for any system to 
identify which interactions are trustworthy. Following 
this labeling process, a trust prediction model, which 
can correctly identify the trust boundaries of any inter-
actions and learn the best parameters to combine each 
TA to obtain a final trust value, is proposed based on 
the well-known SVM model. Our simulation results 
have shown promising outcomes including the ability 
and accuracy of the algorithm with respect to identify-
ing trustworthiness interactions.  
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